“Protecting our knowledge means protecting our academic freedom”
War in Europe, the escalating rivalry between the USA and China - the rapidly shifting geopolitical situation is focussing more than ever on the question of how Swiss universities will be able to protect their knowledge.
Acting on behalf of the Swiss University Conference (SUC), swissuniversities, the conference of rectors of Swiss universities, has set up a working group to address these issues. Günther Dissertori, Rector of ETH Zurich and head of the working group, explains the key findings and recommendations of the recently published report.
“Universities are facing a difficult balancing act: They must protect sensitive knowledge without restricting the openness of science to an unnecessary degree.”Günther Dissertori
Was there a specific trigger prompting the report? Has the incidence of espionage increased at Swiss universities?
Günther Dissertori: No, I am not aware of any build-up of espionage cases. The risk of state-sponsored spying activities or economic espionage, however, has increased - especially in the area of sensitive key technologies. In view of the tense geopolitical situation, universities are facing a difficult balancing act: They must protect sensitive knowledge and critical technologies without restricting the openness of science to an unnecessary degree.
Is this a contradiction?
I see things more like this: We need to create a sound framework that safeguards our freedom of research. If we succeed in establishing a coherent system with effective protective measures, we can continue to exchange information freely and openly within this framework. This will not only protect our research and our knowledge, but also Switzerland's international connectivity and trustworthiness as a vibrant innovation hub. Conversely, if nothing is undertaken, we risk experiencing serious incidents sooner or later, which would then actually result in a severe restriction of our latitudes of freedom.
What does such a system look like?
The system our report proposes is based on three central pillars: greater security awareness and relevant expertise within the universities themselves, a clearer legal framework as well as a national coordination centre.
About the person
Günther Dissertori has been Rector of ETH Zurich since February 2022, including responsibility for teaching. The physicist grew up in South Tyrol and studied at the University of Innsbruck. From there, he moved on to CERN in Geneva as a doctoral student, where he embarked on his research career. In 2001 he was appointed assistant professor at ETH Zurich and became a full professor six years later.
ETH Zurich has had a specialised export control office in place for some time and systematically carries out security checks on students and employees. Should other universities follow this example?
As a university with a strong international network that researches and teaches key technologies, ETH Zurich had already created a specialised export control office back in 2017, established clear processes and thereby complied with SECO's requirements. We are happy to share our experience, and more and more Swiss universities have recently become active in this direction and are also benefiting from our expertise. It is important, however, that such a specialised unit is proportionate to the size and risk profile of an institution. It is quite conceivable that several smaller, less technically orientated universities could operate a joint office or source the necessary expertise externally.
Where do you see scope for improvement in terms of the legislative foundation?
The legal foundation for rejecting applicants for reasons of knowledge security – i.e. in order to protect sensitive information and expertise – must be improved at the national level. There is also a need for clear legal requirements governing and regulating the secure and data protection-compliant exchange of information between universities, authorities and security services that stipulate which data may be shared in which situations.
Should this data be shared by way of a national coordination centre?
We propose a national contact point based on the Dutch model: a central office that networks universities and the relevant authorities, coordinates the secure exchange of information, bundles strategic situation assessments and coordinates measures in response to changing security situations. Close international co-operation with selected countries would also be desirable.
Where exactly should this office be located?
That is still an open question.
“It will also be crucial, however, to continuously review and further develop the interaction between the respective players and the measures implemented in this dynamic environment.”Günther Dissertori
What will be happening now going forward?
The Swiss University Conference has taken note of the working group's report and will determine the next steps. Ideally, a working group could start setting up the proposed structures as from 2026 so that we can work in the new system from 2028 onwards. It will also be crucial, however, to continuously review and further develop the interaction between the respective players and the measures implemented in this dynamic environment.